Many people took notice of the impact of foodborne illness when headlines reported on the Jack in the Box outbreak of 1993. That outbreak resulted in 750 children poisoned with 4 dying. In this case, E. coli went undetected and slipped past all controls to find its way into the hands and stomachs of the victims. In author Jeff Benedict's book "Poisoned," the Jack in the Box executives claimed they had no idea they were serving food that could kill kids. Some of the same causes for that outbreak are still happening today. Unfortunately, it seems that some restaurant organizations need to have a food safety crisis with real measurable casualties before they clean up their act and put real sustained controls in place. 

One possible reason for an increase in foodborne illness outbreaks is that some people think the USDA, FDA and health departments offer enough regulation and provide adequate protection against foodborne illness. However, this is a false sense of security. The USDA is getting ready to cut 259 jobs. It's unlikely that this will be beneficial in protecting our food supply. With budgets diminishing and health departments consolidating their services, health departments are developing new ways to reduce their regulatory oversight of the food service industry. The city of Chicago and the Maricopa County Health Department have already put new plans in place to allow responsible operators to police themselves. If this trend continues, public health officials will only have time to track down these emerging threats rather than trying to prevent them. 

To further complicate the problem, food manufacturers are hiring third-party auditors to prove their food is safe, only to have that practice backfire with the recent cantaloupe and peanut outbreaks. In those cases, the auditors received harsh criticism for not identifying problems, and they gave exceptional scores to the manufacturers that hired them. Third-party auditors are useful tools only when they identify all the food safety deficiencies.

Without more oversight of food safety practices, we'll continue to see headlines such as these:

So, with many restaurants failing to understand that there is a war on foodborne illness happening, who is left to fight? For decades it has been left to local health departments. But we cannot solely rely on the public health sector to set policy and management practices for the restaurant industry. The time has come for the industry as a whole to step up and join the fight. Restaurant owners and operators should hold each other to a higher standard by educating themselves about foodborne illness and striving to serve safe food to the public.

Many in the industry are already taking responsibility. There are plenty of food-safety-conscious owners and operators who are implementing policies and best practices for preventing foodborne illness and promoting food safety in their organizations. This can be expensive, but there really is no comparison to the cost of paying damages from an outbreak. Jeff Benedict reported that it cost Jack in the Box $98 million in damages. Their insurance barely paid it all. How many restaurant organizations out there have a $100 million insurance policy? For many restaurants, having an outbreak spells bankruptcy. Jack in the Box learned its lesson the hard way. As a result, the company hired food safety expert David Theno and revamped its entire food safety program. 

Restaurant owners and managers need to understand that they are potentially handling contaminated product every day. This means it's essential to control all factors that can lead to foodborne illness.

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One sentence in the editorial stated "USDA has concluded that Hannaford's high risk practices likely led to this outbreak," a reference to Salmonella infections linked to supermarket ground beef. Investigators were unable to trace the contaminated ground beef to any one supplier.

USDA officials subsequently contacted me, claiming that the agency did not say Hannaford's practices led to the outbreak, and requested I issue a correction. What the agency stated was that Hannaford's "high-risk practices" for grinding beef, including a lack of grinding logs, were a barrier in its investigation of the outbreak.  

 

I am writing this today not only as a correction, but also to describe how USDA-approved meat laced with E.coli and Salmonella automatically create "high-risk practices" at retail meat markets, hospital cafeteria and meat establishments that purchase boxed beef from source slaughter plants.  Americans need to know how "high-risk" meat is getting into our food chain.

Following the 1993 Jack In The Box outbreak, USDA required the meat industry to implement HACCP (Hazard Analysis Critical Control Point) systems. The agency's previous meat inspection system had been organoleptic, i.e., dependent upon the senses such as smell, sight and touch.  Bacteria such as E.coli O157:H7 and Salmonella cannot be detected via organoleptic methods. USDA claimed that HACCP was built upon science-based inspection and meat production, not in organoleptic senses. The "science-based" foundation of USDA-style HACCP was microbial testing of meat, which can indeed detect the presence of invisible pathogens.

All meat plants were then required to devise their own customized HACCP plans, plus associated practices which would result in the production of consistently safe meat and poultry. Each year, the largest slaughter plants issue annual certifications and letters of guarantee, in which they describe the variety of policies and procedures utilized to produce safe food. Most, if not all, large plants now have these certifications and letters of guarantee available on their websites enabling customers to print copies. The information below comes directly from a variety of these websites.

The largest slaughter plants are highly efficient assembly and disassembly lines, deftly slaughtering and processing up to 6,000 beef daily. To their credit, they have invested millions (some claim BILLIONS) to develop and implement a plethora of scientific interventions which have clearly made our food safer. It is estimated that such scientific advancements add 6 - 8 cents per lb to the cost of beef.

  

The list of laudable interventions and policies is lengthy and exhaustive, including but not limited to:

- Prerequisite programs

- Pre-Operational sanitation programs

- Operational sanitation programs

- Hide-on carcass washes

- Critical Control Points (CCPs), which are points in the process where controls can be used to prevent, eliminate or reduce pathogens to an undetectable level

- Steam vacuuming beef carcasses on the kill floor

- Pre-evisceration and post-evisceration sprays, water and/or lactic acid sprays

- Thermal pasteurization systems: hot water or steam

- Standard operating procedures (SOPs)

- Standard sanitation operating procedures (SSOPs)

- Good manufacturing practices (GMPs)

- Pest control management

- Humane handling protocols

- Allergen control programs

- Testing of carcasses for E.coli, primary generic E.coli

- Salmonella testing programs

- Listeria testing programs

- Test and hold protocols

- Organic acid sprays of carcasses in the cooler

- Product recall programs

- Certificates of Analysis (COAs)

And many, many more.

In recent years, the largest slaughter plants have implemented an additional step with which I am greatly impressed.  When beef carcasses are broken down into component parts such as rounds, loins, ribs, etc, each individual piece of intact meat is placed into a vacuum packaged bag, and then boxed for shipment.  Immediately prior to placement into the vacuum bag, each piece of intact meat is exposed to an antimicrobial spray which further controls pathogens. These intact pieces of meat are, in my opinion, super sanitary, having been exposed to yet one more antimicrobial intervention. Consumers can eat this meat with a high degree of confidence in its safety.

  

I am quite impressed with a statement found in one slaughter company's certification:  "We apply lactic acid to carcasses just prior to Fabrication, peroxyacetic acid to conveyor belts in our Fabrication process, and peroxycacetic acid to primal and sub-primals prior to packaging and to trim on the conveyor belt prior to placing into boxes or bins." This company leaves no stone unturned in its commitment to safe food.

A statement from another slaughter plant: "Primal and sub-primal [intact] products are subject to an antimicrobial spray after trimming but prior to or at bagging. The antimicrobial treatment has been tested in our establishments and has shown to be effective in the reduction of bacteria and is monitored as per our application program."

These plants are a credit to our industry.

Interestingly, the source slaughter plants test ground beef and boneless trimmings for the presence of pathogens, but do not test intact beef cuts. If pathogens were detected on intact cuts, the slaughter plant (and perhaps USDA) would know that its highly heralded HACCP systems had failed.

What is the true frequency of pathogens in intact beef cuts?  At a meat industry conference in Chicago on Sept. 17, 2008, then-USDA Under Secretary for meat inspection Dr. Richard Raymond revealed results of a recent agency experiment.  Dr. Raymond stated that the agency had tested 24 pieces of intact beef cuts for the presence of E.coli O157:H7.  Of the 24 intact cuts, 8 had E. coli O157:H7 on them, and six of the eight were loin cuts. Even if this test was an anomaly, USDA officials are painfully aware of the true incidence of pathogens on intact beef cuts.  So, how does USDA respond to this threat to public health?  The agency gives a Pass Card to the source slaughter plants, blithely allowing the plants to ship into commerce intact cuts which are surface-contaminated with E. coli O157:H7, as well as Salmonella, much to the chagrin of Hannaford and its customers.

An article in the Portland Press Herald quotes Daniel Engeljohn, assistant administrator of USDA's Food Safety and Inspection Service:

I respectfully disagree. The "cuts of meat" to which Engeljohn refers are the intact cuts described above.  These cuts were exposed not only to the plethora of kill-floor interventions listed above, but also to the antimicrobial spray prior to their being packaged, as described above. If consumers can't trust the safety of beef after that phalanx of scientific interventions, we'd better not trust beef at all. Part of Engeljohn's concerns has to do with testing, which will be discussed below.

Several slaughter plants include disclaimers which state that no technology exists that can guarantee fresh meat products are free of pathogens, and that no one is able to guarantee pathogen free raw materials. These statements are absolutely true:  raw meat, which has not been exposed to a kill step such as irradiation or full cooking, cannot be guaranteed to be pathogen free.

Slaughter plants take one additional step to protect themselves from liability for foodborne outbreaks emanating from consumption of their products. In spite of the fact their intact primal cuts have been exposed to the arduous gauntlet of antimicrobial interventions previously described in this report, some packers claim that their intact beef cuts are "NOT INTENDED FOR GRINDING."

Slaughter plants thus admit that an inordinate percentage of their intact cuts are laced with deadly pathogens. So much for the efficacy of their "science based" interventions. Packers use this clever machination to insulate themselves from bacterial liability, even though in all likelihood the bacteria entered the food chain on their kill floor.

  

USDA does NOT object to such disclaimers. Unfortunately, USDA itself admits that the official USDA Mark of Inspection is meaningless. Agency publications have stated:

 

When USDA itself admits that the Mark of Inspection is valueless, coupled with slaughter plants stating that their meat is "NOT INTENDED FOR GRINDING," consumers should be fully forewarned that all raw meat carries a high risk of pathogen contamination. All liability for foodborne sicknesses has now been cleverly shifted onto consumers.

USDA has declared E. coli O157:H7 to be an "adulterant," prohibiting the shipment of adulterant-contaminated meat into commerce. USDA recently proposed adding six more subtypes of E. coli to the list of adulterants. More specifically, USDA states that E. coli O157:H7 is an adulterant in ground beef and in boneless trimmings. Herein lies the rub however:  when E. coli O157:H7 is found on the exterior of intact cuts, USDA classifies the pathogen as a mere contaminant, certainly not a lethal adulterant. Therefore, slaughter plants can ship into commerce intact cuts of meat which are surface-contaminated with E. coli O157:H7, with full agency endorsement.

  

Subsequently, when downstream restaurants, hospital cafeterias and further processing plants open these intact cuts and process them into steaks, roasts and ground beef, only then do these heretofore feckless contaminants mysteriously morph into lethal adulterants!

Processing these intact cuts produce boneless trimmings, which have always been made into ground beef. Grinding trim emanating from these intact cuts is precisely what USDA refers to as "high-risk practices."  Why?  USDA officials have stated many times that grinding such trim is high risk because the trimmings have not been tested, nor treated with antimicrobials.  We need to closely scrutinize this agency statement.

First of all, this agency statement contradicts an industry mantra of the last eight years which is that "We can't test our way to safe food," an erudite statement. Testing alone does not produce safe food. Testing does not remove pathogens from meat, nor does testing apply antimicrobial interventions against raw meat.  Testing is but an indicator of pathogen presence, a brief window in time which reveals the presence of absence of pathogens in a small, limited amount of meat.

USDA's statement lulls consumers into thinking that we can build safety into meat via testing. Pillsbury's original HACCP protocol built safety into meat at each step of the processing line. Testing does not build safety into food.

USDA's contention that processing intact cuts and grinding the associated trimmings as being a "high risk practice" exposes the biased underpinnings of USDA-style HACCP. We must remember that intact cuts originated from those same beef carcasses which were exposed to the wide array of science-based interventions on the kill floor, in the cooler, and in the fabrication room. While still on the original carcass, these intact cuts were exposed to steam pasteurization, lactic acid sprays, hot water rinses, trimming, and all those interventions previously listed.

To top it off, in addition to all these kill-floor interventions, the packers now apply an antimicrobial spray to the intact cuts just before the cuts are vacuum packaged.  After packaging, if the intact cuts are still laced with adulterants, major insanitary conditions persist at the meat plant. USDA disagrees.

Instead, USDA and many in the meat industry continue to pass downstream all pathogen liability to the end users:  retail meat markets (such as Hannaford), restaurants, hospital cafeterias, and individual households. The end users are reminded to use proper food handling and cooking protocol, including prevention of cross contamination.  An article written by Leslie Bridgers at the Portland Press Herald regarding the Hannaford recall included the following quote from USDA's Daniel Engeljohn:

"[USDA] Investigators found that Hannaford would grind trimmings and tube meat without cleaning the equipment in between, he said, raising the possibility of cross contamination." 

 

Since when has USDA developed a commitment to the prevention of cross contamination?  The fact that the agency allows slaughter plants to ship into commerce intact cuts of meat surface-contaminated with E. coli O157:H7 virtually guarantees that entities which process those intact cuts will cross contaminate their facilities. Intact cuts are touched by gloves, aprons, knives, tables, saws, wrapping equipment, etc. Perhaps USDA perceives that everyone handling intact cuts should replace their gloves and aprons between each intact cut of meat, should wash and sanitize their cutting boards, table tops, saws and all related equipment between each intact cut?

Large retail meat markets like Costco and further processing plants will process dozens if not hundreds of boxes (each containing several pieces) of intact cuts on a daily basis. The probability of cross-contamination is daunting.  And the very idea of cleaning and sanitizing all equipment countless times daily, as well as replacing gloves and aprons, is simply not viable.

  

Commingling trimmings with other grindable meat such as "tube meat" does NOT introduce pathogens into the finished product. In all likelihood, pathogens arrived on the exterior of intact cuts in boxes proudly bearing the official USDA Mark of Inspection, which states "USDA Inspected and Passed." This means that USDA knowingly allows E. coli residing on intact cuts to be emblazoned with the agency's Mark of Inspection. Thus, we now have USDA Inspected and Passed Salmonella and E. coli. When E. coli-laced intact cuts are further processed, those same pathogens are deposited onto steaks, roasts and into ground beef.  The commingling of trimmings from multiple sources does NOT introduce E. coli, but spreads it. Don't ask USDA to acknowledge this.

   

USDA's Recall Press Release of the Hannaford recall on Dec,15, 2011 included these statements:

USDA is thus critical of the lack of grinding logs at Hannaford stores. While the existence of copious logs would have greatly aided in the determination of noncompliant source slaughter plants, we must remember that the lack of grinding logs did NOT contribute to the outbreak!  Grinding logs, or the absence thereof, have no connection to the introduction of bacteria into meat.  An establishment may have superlative grinding logs, and will still produce unsafe meat. Garbage in, Garbage out.

  

However, how can USDA be critical of Hannaford's lack of evidence showing the sources of meat being ground?  For many years, the agency itself has steadfastly refused to authorize its own inspectors to document all source evidence at the time of sample collection!

Example:  at a Senate Field Hearing on Dec. 11, 2002, I suggested that when an agency inspector collects a sample of ground beef for E.coli O157:H7 analysis at a USDA Lab, that both the inspector and a plant official should immediately document the source(s) of the meat being ground.  Representing USDA at the hearing was William Smith, then-Deputy Administrator of the Office of Field Operations. He now heads up the agency's OPEER department.  Smith made these two responses to my suggestion for evidence documentation:

On behalf of USDA, Smith admitted not only that the agency doesn't want the inspectors documenting evidence in real time, but also that the source slaughter plants would be "very upset" if the agency were ever audacious enough to empower inspectors to document evidence with no restrictions.

In subsequent years, I've continually pressured the agency to document all source evidence in real time, only to be continually rebuffed.  Finally, on Oct. 8, 2010, USDA issued Notice 58-10, which authorized inspectors to collect all source evidence at the time of sample collection. How many years has USDA been inspecting meat, and not followed commonly accepted scientific sampling criteria which require documenting all evidence?  Copious documentation of unrestricted evidence should have been part and parcel of USDA's meat inspection program since Day One, but has not. Yet, the agency criticizes Hannaford for its lack of grinding logs.

USDA collects routine samples of ground beef for laboratory analysis for E. coli O157:H7, referred to as "verification sampling." From Jan. 1, 2009 to Nov. 30, 2010, the agency's routine verification sampling revealed 64 samples that were positive for E. coli O157:H7.  Of these 64, 29 were collected at plants which purchased all their meat from but one slaughter provider. In all 29 cases, USDA refused to do a traceback to the one well-identified source. The agency deliberately refused to go to the source plant and require corrective actions to prevent recurrences. USDA adroitly avoided any enforcement actions at the source plant, in spite of these 29 golden opportunities to protect public health. 

 

Eventually, USDA mismanagement of public health issues caught up to them. On Aug. 3, 2011, USDA Secretary Tom Vilsack gave a speech in Milwaukee, in which he addressed this issue. He stated:

The FIRST STEP?  You mean to say that after several decades of being in the meat inspection business, that USDA finally decided to embrace traceback protocol in 2011?  Yes.  Well, what happened at the end of 90 days? No official USDA press releases. But on Dec. 29, 2011, a full 148 days later, USDA sent its traceback suggestions to OMB for approval.

Part of the USDA submission was requesting OMB permission to conduct tracebacks when verification sampling revealed the presence of E. coli O157:H7. This awkward revelation shows that USDA perceives it doesn't have the authority to do tracebacks to the source, even when the source has already been clearly identified to be one individual slaughter plant!  Yet USDA claims to act with an "abundance of caution" when protecting consumers from foodborne outbreaks.

  

It is true that USDA referred to "high-risk practices" at Hannaford, but did not state that such practices likely led to the Salmonella outbreak. I am pleased to make this correction. It is only appropriate now that USDA officials publicly state if they believe that Hannaford's practices had ANY connection whatsoever to the introduction of Salmonella into the meat chain. Don't hold your breath. USDA is much more comfortable criticizing Hannaford's allegedly high-risk practices and lack of grinding logs than in admitting that the lack of grinding logs and grinding practices did NOT introduce Salmonella into the meat chain.  Hannaford, and its customers, were innocent victims of purchasing and consuming meat which was already laced with Salmonella when the meat arrived at Hannaford receiving departments.

The real issue here is USDA's ultra-risky policy of allowing slaughter plants to ship intact meat into commerce which is laced with Salmonella and E. coli O157:H7, and subsequently refusing to do tracebacks to the source.

Comparatively speaking, USDA's PR image would have more benefitted by stating that Hannaford's practices likely led to the Salmonella outbreak, than to publicly refer to "high risk" practices.  An in-depth discussion of "high risk" provides us the opportunity to reveal that USDA's policies at the source originating slaughter plants constitute the ultimate cause of high risk meat.  

On January 9, the U.S. Department of Agriculture announced it would close 259 offices, laboratories and other facilities to save $60 million in its $145 billion budget. These closings include five of the 15 Food Safety Inspection Service (FSIS) offices. FSIS is responsible for ensuring meat, poultry and egg safety. USDA undersecretary Dr. Elisabeth Hagen said, "There will be no reduction in inspection presence in slaughter and processing facilities and no risk for consumers." Unfortunately, previous inspector cutbacks and FSIS rules to limit the number and detail of inspector reports on industry non-compliance do put consumers at risk, as a recent 36-million pound meat recall attests.

Aside from closing offices, the budget cutting axe has weakened agencies in charge of protecting public health. In November, the U.S. Food and Drug Administration stated it cannot afford to withdraw the many animal drugs used non-therapeutically in livestock feed to promote growth and prevent disease.  Non-therapeutic use, resulting in meat laced with antibiotic residues, is a factor in increasing human antibiotic resistance. FDA, responding to petitions by medical associations and non-governmental organizations, the first of which were filed in 1999, alleged that the withdrawal of just one drug used in poultry production took five years and $3.3 million, due to industry legal resistance.  Instead, FDA proposes to begin a program with animal drug manufacturers to phase-out some drugs voluntarily. Keep Antibiotics Working (KAW), a coalition to which IATP belongs, wrote to FDA protest that the decision violated FDA's public health mandate. 

In September, USDA announced that budget cuts would curtail or end data collection and reporting on pesticide use on fruits, vegetables and in livestock pens by the National Agricultural Statistics Service (NASS). NASS surveys are used to help formulate food and farm worker safety policy. In November, NASS announced cutbacks to its survey of pesticide and fertilizer use on field crops. Non-governmental organizations protested the cutbacks, saying that the public would be forced to rely on pesticide and fertilizer companies for unverified reporting about agricultural chemical use. 

Our thin budgetary margin for error in curtailing the spread of foodborne illness was brought home forcefully by the U.S. Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC). The CDC (and its state partners, especially in Colorado) took justifiable pride in tracing back a Listeria monocytogenes infection to the packing facility of a melon farm in Colorado just 10 days after the initial hospital report of listeriosis, which had led to 29 deaths by the end of November.

Thomas Frieden, the CDC director, noted in a recent speech that his agency had absorbed the biggest budget cuts in its history in 2010 and 2011. (The U.S. House of Representatives is promising further cuts to the 2012 budget.) Furthermore, "there are 44,000 fewer people working at the state and local level because of the fiscal crisis" in the public health professions.  As a result, in Colorado, college students used their own cell phones and a CDC questionnaire to interview those afflicted with listeriosis. The students helped to trace back to a single farm the source of the Listeria, doing work that had previously been done by public health officials.

  

"How many more cuts to food safety?" -- before students equipped with cell phones and a CDC questionnaire cannot trace back the source of foodborne illness before many more than 29 people die?

  

It should not take a spike in death or illness from foodborne disease to shock us into recognition that food safety is not cheap, nor can food safety be self-regulated among competing companies.  Systematic failure to regulate the financial services industry resulted in ongoing bailouts that have forced FDA and other agencies to claim that rules to protect public health are too expensive, despite plenty of evidence to show the economic and human suffering costs of food safety failures.

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When hired on after college at the Idaho State Journal, I inherited the police beat. It was usually the first beat assignment daily newspapers gave to rookie reporters who did not know anything. I knew a lot less than that.

For many months, I wrote for the ISJ, but I worked at the Pocatello Police Department.  When I learned I had access to incident reports, arrest reports, jail logs and the like without any restriction, I remember asking Chief Perkins why this daily gold mine of information was freely made available to me. He replied, " 'Cause we are the good guys and if you do your job, the public will trust we are doing ours."

Chief Perkins knew more about public trust than all of Washington D.C. and Atlanta GA agency heads with their "transparency" budgets running into the millions. These days we know Americans don't much trust government, especially the one in Washington D.C.

Why top federal officials do not try harder to earn that trust is the only mystery.

Sadly, in the past six months, we've had performances from two such officials involved in food safety that did not restore trust, but only further opened that gap between the people and their government.

I am speaking of Margaret Hamburg, the Food and Drug Administration (FDA) Commissioner, and Robert Tauxe, the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention's (CDC's) deputy director of foodborne, waterborne and environmental diseases.

After cantaloupe contamination led to last year's deadly Listeria outbreak, Hamburg defended FDA's lame "ask your retailers" policy for consumers who wanted to find out where those Jensen Farms melons were being sold. 

As food safety author and microbiologist Phyllis Entis observed, "Consumers should not have to play detective in order to find out whether or not they have been exposed to the risk of infection from a recalled food." That would appear to be especially true for an outbreak where the product being sold at the retail level far outran the distribution area.

Then we had this pitiful set of excuses from Tauxe for the reason CDC withheld Taco Bell's name from its report on a 10-state, 70 sickened Salmonella outbreak, where the food source responsible for the illnesses also could not be determined. 

Lots of other people have commented on this, and I don't mean to pile on.  By contacting the state public health departments, and finding one more interested in following its own state law than in currying favor with Atlanta, we were able to report that the CDC's "Restaurant Chain A" was Taco Bell.

 

Tauxe's rationale that he is the J. Edgar Hoover of public health, able to keep secrets and reel out information to the public when he sees fit, is very dangerous and must be challenged. 

For goodness sake, many in the public think - presumably incorrectly - that Dr. Tauxe is covering for Taco Bell.

Since we outed Taco Bell as "'Restaurant Chain A" and Taco Bell confirmed it, we are wondering how long it will be before CDC updates its Jan. 19 final report on the SE outbreak to include, for the sake of history and researchers, the real name?

Or better yet, when might we expect CDC to update its Dec. 8 final report on the cantaloupe Listeria outbreak to include two more of those confirmed infected in the death toll?  As the keeper of the final record, CDC should honor the dead by including them and accurately marking both their passing and the lethality of the epidemic.

We are not going to hold our breath.

But acknowledging public information publicly would be good for CDC. Issuing retail distribution lists for recalled products to assist the public during outbreaks would be good for FDA.

Lately, however, neither public agency is doing much to restore the public trust the late Chief Perkins knew should never be lost in the first place.

Is there any question why the people are questioning their government?

Salmonella and E. coli are  "enteric" bacterium, which is defined as originating from within animals' intestines, and is thus present in manure.  Live beef arriving at slaughter plants frequently carry a sizeable amount of manure on their hides, creating an obvious risk during hide removal on the kill floor, where airborne enteric bacteria can easily become attached to beef carcasses.  And, when hides touch an exposed carcass, bacteria are directly deposited onto carcasses.  Retail chains, Hannaford being but one example, do not have intestines or manure-covered hides on their premises.  Therefore, we can conclude that Salmonella found in meat at retail meat markets was in all likelihood deposited onto carcasses on the kill floor, and the contamination did not occur at the retail meat market. 

Furthermore, the current recall of Hannaford meat covers seven states, with 20 reported illnesses.  The meat was processed at various Hannaford locations, in several states.  What is the probability that each of these Hannaford stores simultaneously introduced this one specific strain of Salmonella into their products, causing the outbreak?  Answer:  ZERO.  However, it does reveal that one of Hannaford suppliers suffered from a monumental breakdown in sanitary dressing procedures on its kill floor on one or more days, producing unsafe meat which was sent to the various Hannaford stores during this brief moment in time.

How does USDA view this public health dilemma?  USDA has concluded that Hannaford's high risk practices likely lead to this outbreak.  Admittedly, Hannaford didn't maintain grinding logs, which if used could have delineated the one source of contaminated meat.  Also, when the Hannaford meat cutters processed incoming meat, such as chucks and rounds, Hannaford kept the trimmings and put it into ground beef.  Totally legal, as the industry has done this since time immemorial.  My plant produced ground beef from trimmings for 59 years, under the watchful eye of USDA inspectors and their supervisors, none of whom objected.  Can you imagine buying a half of beef for your home freezer, only to be told that you cannot get any ground beef off that half, because USDA piously proclaims that ground beef produced from trimmings are "high risk" for bacteria?

The fact remains that if Hannaford has maintained perfect grinding logs, the outbreak would still have occurred.  The outbreak was NOT the result of a lack of grinding logs, but the presence of Salmonella in meat which Hannaford had purchased from a source slaughter provider.  And, even if Hannaford had tested the trimmings, and the lab result was negative for Salmonella, no guarantee for safe meat could be issued because labs frequently do not detect the Salmonella.  Even the largest beef slaughter plants issue disclaimers that even though their meat is tested, and tested negative, that the plants cannot issue a guarantee of safe meat because a silver bullet has not been developed to develop pathogen-free meat.  And, does USDA expect every retail meat market to conduct expensive microbial testing on every batch of ground beef produced?  Consider this fact:  the largest packers test every 10,000-lb. batch of trimmings by collecting 1 - 2 lbs. of trim for lab analysis.  It would only be equitable if every retail market tested 1 - 2 lbs. of ground beef every 10,000 lbs.  Would be quite infrequent.  What's good for the goose (the source slaughter plant), is good for the gander (the retail meat market).

Please also note that when USDA inspectors collect ground beef samples at USDA-inspected establishments for Salmonella analysis, the agency allows up to a 7.5 percent incidence of positives before the agency will commence enforcement actions at the plant.  USDA's aloof stance is that if only 7.5 percent of your ground beef is laced with Salmonella, consumers won't be endangered.  However, if 8 percent or more of your ground beef has Salmonella, then, only then, will public health be imperiled.

CDC statistics show that 10 times as many Americans die from Salmonella as from E. coli.  USDA's response to such lethal statistics?  First of all, 7.5 percent Salmonella won't hurt anyone.  Secondly, the agency assesses all liability for Salmonella- and E.coli-laced meat to the downstream further processor, such as Hannaford.  USDA also issues a pass card to the large, source originating slaughter plants.  Only when this travesty of food safety justice is aggressively resolved will we Americans experience a lower incidence of foodborne outbreaks.

Bottom Line:  Hannaford's processing of trim, and lack of grinding logs, did NOT introduce Salmonella into its ground beef.  Nevertheless, USDA now accuses Hannaford's allegedly "high risk" practices to be the cause of the current outbreak.  This is but the latest in countless examples of USDA's refusal to conduct tracebacks to the SOURCE, that is, to the large slaughter plants.  USDA's insistence on assigning all pathogen liability to the downstream further processor virtually guarantees American consumers of future recurring outbreaks.

The link below will take you to a blog by Bill Marler, which reveals how USDA blithely blames Hannaford for this outbreak.

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In the United Kingdom, the Food Safety Agency that was established in the wake of the "mad cow" disease outbreak, amongst other food safety scares, was essentially dismantled with its portfolio being returned to Ministry of Agriculture (DEFRA).

In Canada, the number of CFIA inspectors was increased following the listeriosis outbreak of 2008 in which contaminated deli meats resulted in 20 deaths. However, the Canadian government is now cutting over 200 inspectors in a bid to save $25 million from the federal budget.

In the United States, the cutbacks have been deeper, with over 260 USDA offices being closed for a savings of $150 million per year.

In reaction, many consumer groups, the press and unions have pronounced the cutbacks as placing the public in danger through the governments neglecting their responsibilities.

The old question is thus posed: Does more government involvement, specifically in relation to inspector numbers, lead to a more effective food safety system?

A similar question is posed by criminologists in relation to police numbers and crime rates. Those on one side of the argument use statistics to show that an increase in police numbers results in decreased crime rates. However, what is missed is that an increase in policing is commonly preceded by a major event, such as 9/11 or when pre-existing crime levels are high.

In other studies, where no major event has occurred, it has been found that there is no correlation between police on the ground and crime rates.

The theory goes that high numbers of police on the ground lead to an increased level of crime detection but do little to prevent crime from occurring. As sociologists will indicate, crime rates are mostly affected by the environment, such as socio-economic factors and community cohesion - in effect the existing culture. To take the argument further, it is thought that increasing the level of policing can bring a siege-like atmosphere to a community and negatively affect the community cohesion.

Returning to food safety, we can make parallels between the effect of policing on crime rates and superimpose on the number of food inspectors and foodborne illness outbreaks. 

Specifically, inspector numbers increase or reorganization of agencies occurs following a major foodborne illness outbreak.

Yet, what is missed is that in the event of an outbreak, it is the industry response that is primarily responsible for enhancing food safety and not visits by an army of food inspectors. Nevertheless, food inspection does play a major role in containing outbreaks and follow-up investigations, although this is different from prevention.    

Industry-led initiatives are the only way to enhance food safety

In the 1980s, there was a diverse range of food safety issues of concern. Foodborne illness rates were increasing, virulent pathogens such as E. coli O157 were taking hold, not to mention the BSE and problems with the emergence of drug-resistant microbes.

In response, a directive from President Clinton's administration set to prioritize food safety risks, reduce red tape and bureaucracy. The directive essentially empowered the industry to take responsibility for food safety by introducing HACCP, amongst other initiatives.

There is little debate that the initiatives were highly successful in reducing the incidence of foodborne illness with a progressive decrease in numbers since implementation.

A more recent example of industry-led initiatives is in relation to the use of antibiotics in animal production. Antibiotics have been commonly used in animal production to prevent infections, thereby leading to high growth rates. However, a negative effect of antibiotics has been the emergence of lethal antibiotic strains of pathogens such as Salmonella, amongst others.

The FDA has debated the banning of antibiotics for promoting animal growth for over 30 years. In late 2011, the FDA somewhat unexpectedly stepped back from banning antibiotics in animal production, which is counter to the actions taken over in the EU.

Many commentators saw this as a capitulation of the FDA to the lobbying pressure from the meat industry. However, the reality is that the meat industry has been proactive in reducing the use of antibiotics in animal production on the understanding that a staged reduction is required. Of course, this is not well-publicized but illustrates that only a successful antibiotic reduction program can be achieved if led by industry and not by government. 

The empowerment of industry to self-regulate always comes under criticism in the event of a foodborne illness outbreak. The knee-jerk reaction always appears to be more testing, more inspectors, more agencies etc.

In many ways, "tinkering" with the food safety system by government hinders the progress that has been made since 1995. Ultimately, industry-led initiatives will always be the most effective approach to improve food safety. Consequently, rather than increasing government inspection a more productive strategy is how to remove the weak links in the chain to prevent outbreaks from occurring in the first place.

Such a strategy is far from straightforward, as there is a need to understand the underlying basis for decisions made that ultimately led to critical errors of judgment in foodborne illness outbreaks.

For example, why do processors send out product known to be contaminated or perform practices that represent obvious food safety risks? In a broad sense, it can be proposed that the actions are through ignorance (lack of knowledge is perhaps a better term) of the risk, economic factors or, in a relatively low number of instances, bioterrorism or criminal intent.

Ironically, it is the latter group who have the greatest perception of empowerment given they are controlling events.  In contrast, those that lack knowledge may have good intentions in producing high quality products, although fail to see the consequences. It is almost akin to a thought pattern of "nobody told me not to do it."

The current trend of clean labels, along with producers of organic products, can be classed in this group, where attempts to produce additive-free foods leads to food safety risks (for example, omitting nitrites to control Clostridium botulinum).  Also included in this group are food handlers, quality assurance personnel and management whose main focus is to produce product as fast as possible with little thought of ownership or empowerment.

Workers have a tendency to lack empowerment, as they are told what to do and when to do it. This ultimately leads to a disconnect between the product and food safety. In the processing environment, workers are judged on how quickly the product can be processed regardless if the production line is producing ready-to-eat deli meat, cars or paper-clips.

Even if food violations occur, there is little incentive for the worker to raise concerns or to be empowered to make suggestions. When visiting processing plants, I sometimes ask the workers if they consume the products produced in the facility. In the majority of cases, the answer is no, due to their prior knowledge of the history of the product. Clearly those workers have a disconnect or lack of ownership with the product.

Akin to when the industry is highly regulated by government, the lack of empowerment by food workers throughout an organization ultimately leads to essentially passing-the-buck when it comes to food safety - an "it is not my problem" attitude.

It could be argued that empowerment is encompassed in the concept of a food safety culture. Yet "food safety culture" remains a relatively woolly term that lacks the nuts-and-bolts on how to change the behavior of those working in the food industry. There is frequent reference to increasing knowledge by training. However, knowledge and empowerment are very different. 

Frank Yiannas introduced the term food safety culture, and noted the major challenges in changing worker behavior - after all, it does take a generation. Still every road starts with a first step and rather than look at the loss of government inspectors as entering the Dark Age we should look at this as an opportunity for industry to be empowered to take food safety initiatives to the next level.

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At least two promising vaccines for E. coli O157:H7 are awaiting licensing approval from the Center for Veterinary Biologics (CVB) at APHIS.  CVB has a long history with animal vaccines, but has primarily focused on those that improve animal health -- not human health.  The E. coli vaccines under consideration are not designed to prevent illness in the animal, but could significantly decrease the amount of the pathogen present in the pre-harvest environment, and presumably in the meat that winds up on consumers' plates.  Vaccines focusing on public, rather than animal, health represent fairly new ground for the agency.  Given the delays in their approval, CVB may be having trouble adjusting its vision.

  

In a series of conversations with many of the players involved -- representatives from CVB and the pharmaceutical companies awaiting licensure -- CVB's approach has been striking.  Far from being enthusiastic about the public health possibilities of pre-harvest vaccines for E. coli, the agency instead seems beleaguered and adrift on the issue, even admitting in one conversation that although there's no scientific downside to the vaccines, there are some economic and practical issues to consider.  Perhaps there are economic and practical issues to consider -- but that's not CVB's mission. The fiscal implications and logistical applications to these vaccines are issues for the free market to deal with, and not reasons to delay licensing of promising new technologies that could make a significant public health impact.

  

The key issue for CVB -- indeed, the only issue the agency has authority to consider -- is whether the vaccines are pure, safe, potent, and effective.  In meetings with CVB officials, the agency acknowledges that the vaccines under consideration have cleared the first three hurdles.  It's the efficacy that appears to be tripping them up.  CVB says that the industry wants an expectation of efficacy that would decrease summer E. coli shedding rates in cattle to approximate winter shedding rates, an efficacy of between 55 and 65 percent.  This is a laudable goal, and it's useful to know what the industry would like to see from a new pre-harvest tool to combat contamination.  But surely the Food Safety and Inspection Service (FSIS), the agency whose mission is to ensure the safety of meat for consumers, has an opinion on whether that expectation of efficacy is too high, too low, or just right?  Unfortunately, CVB doesn't know it.  From what we can tell, CVB has a bold new responsibility to consider vaccines with a possibly significant public health impact, but they haven't taken steps toward a meaningful collaboration with the relevant public health agency that sits in the same building to decide how best to exercise that power.

  

How CVB came into its responsibility for vaccines that have a public health focus (rather than the traditional animal health focus) is somewhat mysterious.  Perhaps it was simply that the agency was left without a chair when, in the early 2000s, the music stopped on a debate about where to house these types of animal vaccine approvals.  True or not, the agency has entered a new era -- one where their focus on animal health must share the spotlight with a commensurate consideration for public health.

  

It's time for CVB to embrace that new responsibility, first by re-focusing on its actual statutory mission and away from tangential issues of practicality and economy.  Second, the agency must consult with FSIS and gather the relevant stakeholders to discuss how vaccines can make a contribution to public health.  Third, CVB should streamline and make more transparent the entire process of vaccine approval, so that interested parties can follow the progress -- or lack thereof -- of promising technologies under consideration.

There's no guarantee about these vaccines, but even without a silver bullet, it is possible much progress can still be made.  CVB has the authority and the responsibility to put yet another tool in the box to fight the scourge of E. coli.  Now the agency must rise to meet its new public health role, by streamlining, prioritizing, and publicizing the vaccine approval process for those technologies that could have a significant impact on public health.

Here's a letter written by the Center for Science in the Public Interest to USDA Secretary Tom Vilsack about the delay in vaccine approvals.

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The Utah bill, S.B. 34:

• Prohibits federal regulation of an agricultural product that remains in Utah after it is made, grown, or produced in Utah;

• Allows a person to identify certain agricultural products by indicating that the products are "Made in Utah," "Grown in Utah," or "Produced in Utah;"

• Prohibits a person from claiming that an agricultural product was made, grown, or produced in Utah if the product is not a Utah agricultural product; and

• Makes it a class A misdemeanor for a person to enforce federal regulation of a Utah agricultural product that remains in Utah.

Under the bill, the definition of "Utah agricultural product" is an agricultural product that is entirely, (i) made in Utah, (ii) grown in Utah, (iii) produced in Utah or produced with an insignificant part of a basic or generic material that is acquired from outside of Utah.

I guess that could mean made/grown/produced in Utah and a little bit in China?

  

Perhaps even more problematic than SB 34's possible conflict with Congress's power under the Commerce Clause, is that SB 34 creates criminal liability for state or local officers trying to enforce federal law. This is a conflict with federal law if ever there was one, presuming, of course, that Congress (and its statutorily created agencies, the FDA and USDA) had the constitutional power to regulate the conduct in the first place.

The New Hampshire bill, HB 1650-FN:

Like Utah's bill, this bill seeks to 

• Exempt foodstuffs grown or produced, and then sold, in New Hampshire from federal regulation if the product is labeled "Made in New Hampshire;" and,

• Provides penalties for both agents attempting to enforce federal regulations and for producers and processors who label their food as "Made in New Hampshire" when it does not meet "Made in New Hampshire" requirements.

According to the preamble, the purpose of the New Hampshire bill is to allow for locally produced food products to be sold and consumed within New Hampshire and to encourage the expansion and accessibility of farmers' markets, roadside stands, farm and home-based sales, and producer-to-end-consumer agricultural sales.

First, these bills seem to lack any clear point.  The sale of local food certainly is not improperly impeded by the fact that there are federal laws that bear on the production of that food. And clearly, these bills are not motivated by a concern for the public's safety. Instead, these bills are just a effort to piecemeal these states out of an entirely constitutional regulatory scheme that, like it or not (and pretty clearly, they don't like it) allows for federal regulation and oversight over a broad range of food producers and food producing activities.  Even New Hampshire's slogan "Live Free or Die" must recognize the federal government's constitutional role in our society.

 

On that point, exactly what is the federal government's power to control the methods and manners by which our food is produced and sold?  Most will immediately jump to the Commerce Clause of the U.S. Constitution. Undoubtedly, this powerful set of words is a part of the equation, but it is only a part. The federal government not only has plenary (meaning complete and all encompassing) power over interstate commerce -- i.e. commerce between the states -- but also can constitutionally undertake any act, so long as it does not infringe on some individual right guaranteed by the bill of rights or some power granted to another branch of government, that is "necessary and proper" to the furtherance of its enumerated power over interstate commerce.

  

Just words? Think again. A little more history:  The federal government is one of enumerated powers, meaning that it can act only where it has the constitutional authority to do so.  As James Madison wrote:

The Federalist No. 45, pp. 292-293 (C. Rossiter ed. 1961).  Among the powers specifically delegated to the federal government is the power "[t]o regulate Commerce with foreign Nations, and among the several States, and with the Indian Tribes."  U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3.  The "commerce clause" has, of course, become a particularly potent regulatory enabler that, as a result, has spawned a notoriously complex body of case law. See generally United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549 (1994) (Kennedy, J., concurring). For present purposes, however, it suffices to say that the Commerce Clause has provided the constitutional authority for a great many landmark legislative and regulatory measures.

The Supreme Court's interpretation of these powers has produced a complex line of case law that contemplates the rightful regulation of things that appear to be even intrastate matters--i.e. local actions that do not involve the sales of goods and services across state lines--as long as those matters have a "substantial economic effect on interstate commerce."  See Wickard v. Filburn, 317 U.S. 111, 125 (1942) (emphasis added).   "[E]ven if appellee's activity be local and though it may not be regarded as commerce, it may still, whatever its nature, be reached by Congress if it exerts a substantial economic effect on interstate commerce."  Id.

This is mere food for thought, as it remains to be seen how the actions that are seemingly insulated from federal reach by the Utah and New Hampshire bills actually affect interstate commerce.  The crafting of the Utah and New Hampshire legislation to require the production (well, maybe not all of it) of the food in state and that it be consumed or remain in state (hmm, what about Internet sales and roadside stands or farmer's markets near state borders?), at most allows these states to walk a fine line around the Commerce Clause.

And then, again, there are the provisions in these bills that seek to criminalize any action taken to enforce a federal law that is in conflict with the dictates of these bills.  Even the bills themselves acknowledge the potential tension with the Supremacy Clause of the U.S. Constitution (Article VI, Section 2):  "This Constitution, and the Laws of the United States . . . shall be the supreme Law of the Land; and the Judges in every State shall be bound thereby, any Thing in the Constitution or Laws of any State to the Contrary notwithstanding."

The Utah bill's legislative analysis acknowledges that the United States Supreme Court has "long recognized that state laws that conflict with federal law are 'without effect,' " Altria Group, Inc. v. Good, 555 U.S. 70, 76 (2008), quoting Maryland v. Louisiana, 451 U.S. 725, 746 (1981), and has further held that an individual cannot be guilty of a state crime if the individual was acting necessarily and properly under the authority of the laws of the United States. Cunningham v. Neagle, 135 U.S. 1, 75 (1890).

The only relevant question is whether Congress, again through its statutorily created agencies FDA and USDA, has the power to regulate, or create the law that is in conflict with the Utah or New Hampshire law, in the first place.  If so, there is an unconstitutional conflict with the Supremacy Clause, and these states laws are of no force and effect.

Again, on this question the Necessary and Proper Clause speaks loudly. Properly created federal agencies like the FDA and USDA have the constitutional power to make any regulation that is both necessary and proper to the effectuation of its constitutional authority over interstate commerce.  And this, as the Supreme Court said in Wickard v. Filburn, potentially reaches even activities that appear purely local in character.

  

At best, the Utah and New Hampshire bills raise a number of Constitutional concerns.  At worst, we should all just view these bills for what they really are:  likely misguided attempts to address the concerns of just a few about feared governmental intrusion into our private lives.  I'm all for freedom, but not every guy who espouses the power of his constitutional rights and liberties is correct in his analysis of constitutional jurisprudence.  I would say that the supporters of these bills have conscientiously walked a fine line between constitutional right and wrong, and have done so in a basically empty manner.

  

What do these bills really accomplish?

More to the point, what are Utah and New Hampshire farmers and food producers afraid of?  Are they really afraid of the FDA and FSIS regulating food safety within the state, especially when it is likely that the food may cross state boundaries?  And, why would the legislatures even consider laws that are likely unconstitutional?  Is it to curry favor with constituents, or stick a thumb in Uncle Sam's eye?

The point should be to produce safe food, not to push legislation that essentially meaningless.

You might recall in 2010 how that product gained much notoriety for sending scores of college students to the emergency room as a result of its dangerous combination of alcohol with caffeine. In a rare victory of government action in favor of public safety, in November 2010, the Food and Drug Administration forced Phusion and other companies to remove the caffeine. (Read my case study here.) But of course, the story doesn't end there, as these companies always have another trick up their sleeve to get youth hooked.

Now, the "caffeine-free" versions of these highly sweet, soda-like concoctions known as alcopops have grown to high-octane super-size cans, containing as much as 4-5 servings of alcohol, and all for the price of a cheap beer. Public health advocates, policymakers, and state attorneys general have been trying to bring these products down to size through a variety of legal measures. Now comes the Federal Trade Commission with its proposed agreement with Phusion Projects, not to actually reduce the container size or amount of alcohol. But rather, to require better labeling, which will serve as a great advertisement.

That's why I asked colleagues and groups to sign on my letter in opposition to the proposal. Numerous others submitted similar comments raising many objections, including the American Medical Association, the New York City health department, and Public Health Law and Policy. Most importantly, a strong group of state attorneys general who have been working on this issue for years raised five pages worth of objections in their impressive letter. (It was thanks to these state officials that FDA acted on the caffeine.)

In addition, several industry members took the side of public health, and not just for the usual self-serving reasons. For several years, I called upon beer wholesalers to speak out against dangerous products such as caffeinated alcoholic beverages. While several business owners expressed to me privately that they hated these youth-oriented beverages, (and the bad publicity that accompanies them) none took a public stand against them. I am therefore happy to report that the National Beer Wholesalers Association, a powerful lobbying group, wrote a pretty strong letter to oppose the agreement. From their comments:

The label contemplated by the proposed settlement could actually serve to entice consumers, especially younger ones seeking high-alcohol, low-priced products, to possibly over consume these products.

This important point made by myself and others is not the sort of rhetoric we are used to hearing from the likes of beer lobbyists. In addition to this large trade group being on the right side of the issue, several individual beer distributors also opposed the settlement. For example, John Dickerson, a distributor based in Ohio signed on to my letter. Also, Robert Archer, president of Blue Ridge Beverage, wrote his own very strong letter, saying that "the issues surrounding large containers and high alcohol content are not effectively addressed simply by putting a 'message' on the container." His comments are especially significant because Archer is next in line to become chair of the National Beer Wholesalers Association.

As someone whose work is centered around criticizing industry for its misdeeds and disingenuous pro-health positions, it's rare for me to give praise. But this show of support for public health from beer wholesalers and their lobbyists is genuine, and should be applauded as a true sign of progress.

Let's hope the Federal Trade Commission hears our collective concerns and either proposes a more effective solution or allows states to assert their legal authority to do a better job.

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Conducted by the Congressional Committee on Energy and Commerce, the investigation included a review of documents from and interviews with FDA; Jensen Farms; its distributor, Frontera Produce; and its third-party auditor, Primus Labs. And it was the information obtained from and about the audits that was highlighted as of most significant issue - and concern - in the report. The report was accompanied by a Letter from the Committee to FDA Commissioner Margaret Hamburg that further emphasized concern around the use of third-party auditors. The letter to Commissioner Hamburg stated:

"We urge you to review closely the information uncovered during our investigation. In particular, the investigation identified significant problems with the third-party inspection system used by growers and distributors ... FDA officials identified "serious design flaws" in the processing technique used at Jensen Farms and "poor sanitary design of the facility itself" as the causes of the contamination, and they indicated that "everything that was found wrong was addressed in FDA guidance" published in 2009. Yet these flawed facility designs and processing techniques were both recommended by and rated as "superior" by the third-party auditor of Jensen Farms.

This finding revealed two major industry problem areas:

 

As the letter states "The auditing failed in the case of the recent Listeria outbreak." These failures are itemized as the auditors:

- missing or failing to prioritize important food safety deficiencies

- lacking any regulatory authority and not reporting identified problems to any regulatory authority

- not ensuring that identified problems were resolved

- providing advance notice of site visits

- spending only a short period of time on-site

- multiple conflicts of interest

In defense, Jerry Walzel, the president of Bio Food Safety, Inc., the subcontractor hired by Primus Labs to conduct the Jensen Farms audit, stated that consistent with Primus Labs policy - the audits only deducted from the score if a method or technique was inconsistent with FDA regulations; they did not deduct from the score if FDA guidance was not being followed - which brings up the second major issue.

The auditors' findings were not based on the practices of the best farms and failed to ensure that the producer met FDA guidance.

I don't believe that Walzel's additional statement that "guidelines are opinions ... regulations are law" is indicative of the perception and practices followed by the industry and/or its auditors. But if that is a view, the consequence will herald the end of self-policing and ensure that all GMPs and guidance documents become regulation.

The issue of what to do about FDA guidance vs. regulations is not new. The fact that "one does not have to follow guidance" is true in a literal sense. But from a practical perspective, any company that does not follow FDA guidance is, quite frankly, looking for trouble. In fact, whether or not this is indicative of majority perception, the fact remains that it was unfortunately stated as defense in an outbreak that sickened 146 people in 28 states, killed 30, and caused a miscarriage; that an official of a leading auditing agency told the committee that his company "did not consider FDA guidance when conducting audits;" and that a processor with "serious design flaws" passed its audit with a 96 percent and no deficiencies noted or corrective action stated. Aside from the human tragedy associated with this outbreak, this report and the accompanying letter are another black eye for third-party audit systems. This is a sad reflection of a system that has much to add to food safety and public health. If not to assure food safety, what is the purpose of third-party audits on which so much of the industry depends?

Additionally, each of the Jensen Farm or third-party audit failures noted by the committee raises further question, the answers of which will impact the entire industry. For example, in noting the auditors' failure to report problems to regulatory authorities, the question to be asked is - If you are in a food plant and see an obvious Class I hazard, do you have an obligation to report it? Although FSMA Section 307, Accreditation of Third-Party Auditors, states that the results of a regulatory third-party audit are to determine if the facility can be certified, while the results of a consultative audit "are for internal purposes only," does the consultative auditor still hold a legal responsibility to report Class I hazards to FDA? This is a question to which there does not yet appear to be a clear answer, but has wide ranging implications if the answer is "yes."

It is through FSMA that Congress expects FDA to fix these failures. As the letter explains, FSMA requires that FDA establish an accreditation system and model auditing standards for third-party audits of imported foods. However, the standards are expected to influence domestic audits as well, and the committee suggested that "FDA consider developing a voluntary model program for domestic auditors that could become the standard of care for third-party auditing programs in the United States."

We have to hope that the details will be clearly and comprehensively specified when the regulatory language of the section is published. And we should all hope that, for the sake of the food industry and the consumer, that the setting of robust standards for these foreign audits - and auditors, will put third-party audits in a good light and not become a source of constant criticism and doubt. There are already some robust third-party audit programs, but those who are looking for problems don't differentiate the good from the bad, and thus Congressional focus, such as happened recently, is nothing but damaging to a system that has great capacity to protect both brands and public health. 

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The first report, released on January 17th, summarized the results of an investigation into a 10-month long outbreak of Salmonella Typhimurium associated with exposure to clinical and teaching microbiology laboratories. The second report, released on January 19th, presented the results of an investigation into a 2-month long multi-state outbreak of Salmonella Enteritidis infections linked to a restaurant chain.

These two outbreaks had very little in common with each other; the outbreak settings were different, the scope and duration of the outbreaks were different, and the source of the infections was different. Nevertheless, the two outbreaks have one very important thing in common.

CDC, in conjunction with at least some of its public health partners at the state and local level, has chosen to withhold important information from the public.

What information has CDC withheld, and why should this information be released? Here is a list of questions that I sent to my media contact at CDC on January 18th, the day after the Salmonella Typhimurium outbreak report was released.

Is there a specific reason why CDC is not specifying the identity of the commercial strain of Salmonella Typhimurium that is associated with this outbreak (by the ATCC or NCTC strain number - not the commercial supplier)? Can you provide me with the strain number ID?

Does CDC have any hypothesis as to the trigger for this outbreak? Most of the commercial strains have been in use in various labs for many years. What may have happened to initiate the increase in cases? What determined the start date? With a baseline rate for the outbreak strain of 0 to 4 reports/week, how were the start and ending date established for this outbreak?

Were the outbreak cases all tied to the same commercial source of the S. Typhimurium "Strain X"?

Were the outbreak cases tied to the use of a specific format of the commercial source (for example, Bacti-discs or pre-filled inoculation loops)?

Have any cases involving this same strain been reported to CDC since the last "outbreak" case on June 29, 2011? If so, how has CDC differentiated those cases from the outbreak cases (keeping in mind the baseline of 0-4 cases per week mentioned in the CDC report).

Were the bulk of the cases linked to student labs or to clinical labs?

To these questions, I would now add, "Were the clinical lab cases tied mainly to in-hospital labs, or to free-standing commercial clinical labs? If the latter, was any single commercial lab chain disproportionately involved?"

When the Salmonella Enteritidis restaurant chain outbreak report hit the internet, I again contacted my CDC media liaison and asked, "Can you please explain why CDC has not revealed the name of the restaurant chain implicated in the above-mentioned outbreak? Even better, can you identify the chain by name?"

I realize that both outbreaks are "over" and that at least some of this information now is academic. Nevertheless, I question CDC's actions in withholding information that could influence purchasing decisions on the part of consumers and of medical and lab professionals.

CDC reported on January 19th that Restaurant Chain A's handling and cooking processes likely ruled out ground beef as a source of the Salmonella Enteritidis outbreak. This is favorable to the restaurant chain, and would give consumers comfort that the restaurants belonging to this fast food chain are following appropriate food-handling procedures--if only CDC had released the name of the chain.

As for the lab-related outbreak, if I was still running a microbiology lab, I would certainly want to know whether a specific packaging or format of commercially available control culture was more prone to contaminating the lab surroundings than others. I would opt to avoid this format, if I had the information and the choice. Likewise, as a medical doctor, I would opt to avoid a commercial clinical lab chain that was prone to in-lab contamination.

If either of these outbreaks had been traced to a specific packaged food, the offending food would have been named. There is no logical reason for restaurant-linked outbreaks to be handled differently. There is no logical reason for a lab-related outbreak to be handled differently.

I would appreciate receiving substantive answers to my questions.

Sincerely yours,

Phyllis Entis, MSc., SM(NRCM)

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The General Accountability Office (GAO) released a 345-page report to Congress in March, 2011, that proposed changes in efficiencies in federal programs that would save us tax payers $200,000,000,000. I will confess I have not and will not read the entire report. My interests are limited to the 4-5 pages in the report on food safety.

In those few pages, the GAO calls for a single food safety agency at the federal level, but the $200 billion in savings is not impacted by this suggestion. Their proposal for a single food safety system is budget neutral.

And herein lies the rub. Meat and poultry plants must have daily, continuous inspection to operate. It is the law. If a single food safety agency combines employees, duties and dollars, FDA can do nothing more than it is currently doing. Nothing will change.

Food Safety News posted an op-ed by me on Monday, Jan. 16, that was in opposition to a single food safety agency. Since I have publicly professed to detest complainers who bring nothing to the table to solve problems, here are my thoughts on what real change could look like and still be budget neutral: 

The GAO report cites the massive Iowa-based Salmonella egg recall and outbreak as a perfect example of the fragmented food safety inspection system, and it is a great example.

But it does not take a single food safety system to place all eggs under the USDA. Congress "scrambled" the egg inspection system back in 1970 when it passed the Egg Products Inspection Act that gave egg products to the USDA and shell eggs to the FDA. They can unscramble this situation by putting all eggs under the USDA. Simple move, no mess, and it would address a problem that became elevated in the public's eye in 2010.

They can also put all animals, including bison, fish and seafood, under the USDA and add all products from animals to the USDA list. That would bring all dairy products, eggs and even casings under USDA/FSIS daily continuous inspection.

Currently casings (animal intestines), all fish except catfish, and bison, unless they pay for FSIS inspection, are under FDA's regulatory authority. Yes, by law FSIS has catfish but not bison. See, we don't need a massive single food safety agency to correct these silly deficiencies. We just need some common sense.

Congress could also say that any meat or poultry product that has been inspected at least twice and cooked as a final kill step under FSIS inspection does not need to be inspected again when used to make soup, flavorings, baby food, packaged sandwiches, pizzas etc.

 

There is currently a system called dual jurisdiction at work in many facilities. Let's look at pizza as just one example.

A company makes frozen vegetarian pizza and gets no inspection by FDA. Add shrimp and still no inspection. The tomatoes may come from Mexico, the peppers from Chile, the onions from Guatemala and the shrimp from Thailand.

 

Add a little pepperoni from an American plant, pepperoni with the USDA mark of inspection on it, and you add the need for daily, continuous FSIS inspection -- but just for the conveyor belt carrying the pepperoni pizza.

Same goes for canned soup, baby food, etc. It is gross overkill to require inspection for chicken noodle soup but not for tomato soup, and it has nothing to do with protecting the public's health.

The inspection system is totally arbitrary when it comes to corn dogs and bagel dogs, open-face and closed-face sandwiches. Exactly the same product, just different packaging, resulting in either no inspection or daily inspection.

I don't know for certain, but I believe that if USDA removed all the inspectors at the dual jurisdiction plants and put them to work on fish and seafood, eggs and dairy products inspection, it would not only make those products safer, but would probably not increase the cost of food safety.

 

Nearly 80 percent of all the fish and seafood we consume is imported. Almost none is inspected as it arrives in this country, and certainly the number of countries exporting these products is not limited in any way.

If under USDA authority, these countries would first have to have an equivalent food safety system, including daily, continuous federal inspection. Then they would be subjected to annual audits, and the products they export to the U.S. would be re-inspected at an FSIS import house. Just like meat and poultry are today. Food safety would be improved, and the cost is covered by not having vegetable beef soup receive a level of inspection that is simply not needed.

Laws mandating daily, continuous inspection for meat and poultry were passed many decades ago, long before PulseNet (the national surveillance system for foodborne outbreaks) and improved epidemiology revealed that many foodborne illnesses are from produce and other sources, and that meat and poultry are not necessarily the most important carriers of pathogens that can kill us.

We need change, with this I agree, but we do not need change that substantially increases cost and does not increase efficiencies and effectiveness in the federal food safety system. 

We should not waste time and effort on a single food safety agency that Congress and many food safety experts simply will not support, but instead we should focus on who should do what and why and, as another Nebraskan is famous for saying,  just "git 'er done."

So says the ninth annual, "Ready or Not 2011: Protecting The Public's Health From Diseases, Disasters, and Bioterrorism," issued by Trust for America's Health, a non-profit, non-partisan organization dedicated to preventing epidemics to protect people, and Robert Wood Foundation, devoted to improving American's health and health care.

While this may appear like less oversight and regulatory presence for the food industry and, thus, a blessing in disguise, the overall consequences for the industry are not good. The general finding of the report is that federal and state budget cuts have put public health preparedness at risk. Although the focus is on general health initiatives, the relevance to preparedness and response in potential foodborne outbreaks or bioterrorist threats to the food chain can't be ignored.

In fact, every one of the report's key findings has such relevance:

1. 51 cities -- in 40 states -- are at risk for elimination of Cities Readiness Initiative funds, which support the ability to rapidly distribute and administer vaccinations and medications during emergencies.

2. All 10 state labs with "Level 1" chemical threat testing status are at risk for losing top level capabilities, which could leave the U.S. Centers for Disease Control (CDC) with the only public health lab in the country with full chemical testing capabilities.

3. 24 states are at risk of losing expert epidemiology support, which has supplemented state and local gaps in the past.

4. Academic preparedness research and training centers are at risk due to budget cuts.

5. Potential cuts to the National Center for Environmental Health (NCEH) mean the ability for the U.S. Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC) to mount a comprehensive response to nuclear detonation, radiological attacks, chemical attacks and natural disasters is at risk.

6. 40 states and Washington, D.C. cut their state public health budgets -- 29 states cut their budgets for a second year in a row, 15 for three years in a row.

7. 41 states had cuts in state and local preparedness support through the Public Health Emergency and Preparedness (PHEP) grants from FY 2010 to FY 2011.

8. All 50 states and Washington, D.C. had cuts in the Hospital Preparedness Program (HPP) from FY 2010 to FY 2011.

As mentioned, some in the food industry may see such cuts as a good thing, reducing federal and state ability to conduct inspections and thus decreasing the chance of finding problems in a plant.

However, when an outbreak starts, the earlier a potential foodborne illness problem can be found, the more likely it will be able to be contained, and the less potential impact it will have on the food company's brand and litigation risk.

If we were to even focus only on the impact to the food company, it has to be said that while the illness or death of even one or two consumers is bad for business, an outbreak that sickens hundreds or kills tens of people will be many times worse. Focusing back on the consumer, not only are any deaths a horrible thing, but as discussed in a previous newsletter, "Challenges of State Partnerships Reflect Needed Focus for Food Safety and Consumer Confidence," consumer confidence in food safety is already at a low; any increase in outbreaks will only make it worse, and, regardless of budget cuts, serve to force an increase in federal and state focus.

The inclination to drop one's guard when inspections are at a low can be related to the inclination to speed when one knows that budget cuts have reduced a city's ability to keep patrol officers on the highway. Everything is fine, until that high speed leads to a multi-car pile-up.

From a public health perspective, the key findings of this report should be seen as a warning trend. Should such cuts and reduction continue and spread, it could have a significant impact on the entire food industry.

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Irradiation works, but raises feasibility and other concerns.

How about electrocution?

Food Production Daily reports that hitting meat with electrical current reduces toxic E. coli O157:H7 on meat surfaces by 2 log units.

The research report says researchers inoculated meat with the bacteria and then applied electrical current.  But by inoculation they must mean just on the surface, because they only counted surface bacteria.

Surface bacteria, alas, are not the problem.  Searing meat effectively kills surface bacteria.   Bacteria in the interior (of hamburger, for example) survive unless the meat is well cooked.

And 2 log units is unlikely to be good enough for bacteria that cause harm at low doses, as this kind does.  The FDA requires a 5 log reduction for fresh juices, for example.

I wish researchers would apply their talents to figuring out how to keep toxic bacteria from getting into and onto animals in the first place.  Then we wouldn't have to worry about designing techno-fixes to deal with contaminated meat.

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"The Latest in Meat Safety: Another Form of Zapping?" first appeared on Marion Nestle's Food Politics blog Jan. 16, 2012. Reposted with permission.

And what better urban market than one full of eight million people? While the big box retailer is eager to enter the Big Apple, challenges loom large. Given the negative reputation Walmart has earned for being hostile to workers among other problems, many New Yorkers are skeptical, to put it mildly. 

To counter the opposition, Walmart is positioning itself as the solution to urban food deserts - areas where finding real food is next to impossible. But as Anna Lappé has eloquently argued, the big box chain isn't the answer: "Let's be clear, expanding into so-called food deserts is an expansion strategy for Walmart. It's not a charitable move."

Now a report released last month by Manhattan Borough President Scott Stringer concludes that not only would bringing Walmart to Harlem spell disaster for labor, but it could also make an already dire food access problem there even worse. 

Based on data from Chicago's negative experience, the report found that within two years of a Walmart store opening in New York:

- Between 48 and 66 fresh food retailers could go out of business, representing a net loss of between 56,500 to 82,000 square feet of food retail within a one-mile radius;

- Closure of these stores would represent a loss of 50 to 57 percent of the fresh food retail square footage added in recent years by New York City's incentive program; 

- All of this would negate more than $4 million in public finance investment and four years of effort to improve fresh food access in the area.

As Stringer explained, Walmart shouldn't be undermining city programs to improve fresh food availability: "Walmart would be a bane, not a boon, to the health food economy of Harlem - or any other New York City neighborhood."

Moreover, previous economic analysis has shown that Walmart's promise of jobs doesn't pan out either. In a report from last summer called "The Walmartization of New York City," researchers at the City University of New York concluded that, "despite Walmart's promises of jobs and lower prices for the community, the longer term impact is actually the opposite." 

Assuming Walmart opened the 159 stores needed to reach 21 percent grocery market share in New York City (the same proportion the company enjoys nationally), the impact would be a net loss of almost 4,000 jobs, and a loss of more than $453 million in wages per year for all remaining workers. 

What about the new Walmart jobs? According to the report, 4,279 new low-wage Walmart workers would have to "rely on social services to make ends meet, costing New York taxpayers over $4 million per year" in health care benefits alone. This, in a city where the mayor has asked for $2 billion in budget cuts. 

Other areas of the country have already had real world experiences to back up these projected findings. According to New York's Food for Thought report, of all the employers in Ohio, Walmart has the greatest number of associates and dependents enrolled in Medicaid, which in 2009 cost taxpayers $44.8 million. 

Similarly, a 2004 study found that for each of California's whopping 44,000 Walmart employees, taxpayers had to spend $730 on health care and $1,222 on other forms of state and federal assistance such as (ironically) food stamps. 

In 2006, Walmart entered Chicago and recently convinced local officials to approve two additional locations, including (after a long battle) on the city's South Side. How have things fared so far in the original Chicago location? Not so well.

A three-year study released by Loyola University Chicago in 2010 revealed that Walmart had not enhanced retail activity or even employment opportunities. In fact, "the probability of a local retailer going out of business during the study period was significantly higher for establishments close to Walmart's location." Specifically, researchers found that a nearby business had about a 40 percent chance of closing over a two-year period - not very good odds.

Of course Walmart paints an entirely different picture, and is spending a ton of money to hide these sobering facts in a massive PR campaign. According to the Walmartization report, in the first half of 2011 alone, the company spent $2.1 million lobbying in New York, as much as they spent there in the past four years combined. There's even a dedicated website complete with a "fact-checker" and the heartwarming tagline, "Helping NYC Save Money and Live Better." 

Philanthropy is another time-honored corporate tactic, often used to buy silence from critics, curry favor with community leaders, or, in this case, grease the wheels to gain entry into a reluctant-but-lucrative market. 

In December, Walmart announced a combined gift of $250,000 to five various New York City charities, including a home food delivery service and a soup kitchen. Of course $250K is chump change to a company whose net sales topped $405 billion in 2010, but to these five groups it no doubt means a lot. Moreover, in its press release, Walmart made sure to point out the company's "more than $13 million" in donations in New York City since 2007. (Similarly, Walmart pledged to donate $20 million to Chicago charities.) 

But Walmart will need a lot more than a few million dollars in tax-deductible contributions to make up for all the job losses, decrease in available fresh food (and even increased obesity) that could befall New Yorkers. 

Other cities should also brace themselves, as the company is opening four stores in Washington, D.C. later this year, with additional area sites planned. Other locations on the agenda include Boston and San Francisco. But mostly the company is keeping quiet about its urban expansion agenda, at least publicly. Last year in Boston, the company was said to be "quietly chatting up city officials" while scouting neighborhoods. 

I shudder to think of the consequences to American's already suffering urban populations if Walmart succeeds in duplicating its rural retail takeover. What to do about it? Support the United Food and Commercial Workers, which has an important campaign called Making Change at Walmart. See also the Big Box Tool Kit, which is chock-full of news and practical resources. Communities can work together to fight back, we just have to act before it's too late. 

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Food Safety News Editor Dan Flynn reported on Jan. 14, 2012 that if Congress gives the Obama Administration the authority to consolidate six agencies that deal with international trade into one agency, bringing together the two major food safety agencies into one would follow.

This possible move is not totally unexpected from this Administration, nor was the way the Office of Management and Budget's (OMB) thinking was leaked to The Hagstrom Report by a consumer advocate a surprise. What is a surprise to me is that Food & Water Watch was the only consumer advocacy group quoted in the report, which basically fingers them as the leak.

The consumer advocate is reported to have said that the OMB wants to move the Food Safety and Inspection Service (FSIS), currently located in the U.S. Department of Agriculture on the nation's Mall, north to Maryland to become part of the Food and Drug Administration (FDA), which is a branch of the Department of Health and Human Services.

Most consumer groups will support this move if it develops, although Food & Water Watch said it would  "urge against consolidating food safety functions" at this time.

A strong proponent of such a move will be Mike Taylor, a former acting Undersecretary for Food Safety at the USDA and the current Deputy Commissioner for Foods at the FDA. Mike and I appeared together on many panels debating food safety in 2007-2008 and at every opportunity he advocated for a single food safety agency located "anywhere but at the USDA." 

Caroline Smith-DeWaal , Director of Food Safety at Center of Science in the Public Interest, also joined us in several panels and is another strong proponent for a single food safety agency. And the list goes on.

It is my sincere belief that a merger of the two food safety agencies would be an unmitigated disaster in the short term because the cultures are so very different. And unless megadollars flowed with the merger, nothing more could be accomplished than is currently done. 

And there are dozens of other valid reasons to "just say no" to the Administration's thinking.

If you have not yet clicked on the link provided in the first paragraph, do so now to better understand why I am afraid of this proposal, as is Carol Tucker-Foreman, who responded to the article with an in-depth comment, a spot-on discussion of why this talk is so scary to those who know the players. 

FSIS regulates by inspection and enforcement. Their daily presence in nearly every single meat and poultry plant in this country is mandated by law and funded by Congress. They can shutter a plant simply by having the inspectors not show up for work.

FDA regulates by education and writing Good Manufacturing Practices and suggesting policies to follow when producing food. Foods like sprouts, cantaloupe, peanut butter and shell eggs come to mind. And FDA inspection is either by a state entity, a third-party auditor paid by the company or themselves when an outbreak is recognized.

The FDA has no mandate in inspection or audit frequency, and very little in funding to do so. And therefore they very rarely inspect or audit unless a disaster mandates it.

This is not to say one agency is better than the other. They are very different entities, and the laws that they follow are very different also. To blend them into one might be like mixing oil and water.

And that brings me to personalities. There has been some obvious tension and conflict between the two agencies and some of their leaders for decades. Those feelings will not disappear with a Presidential mandate.

 

A very simple example of this is the dual jurisdiction plants. It should be simple to decide if all pizza should be inspected daily, if no pizza needs inspection, or if we should just inspect pizza with meat on it. The same could be said for soups and baby foods. But alas, it is not simple. And a single food safety agency will not change the laws that allow this ridiculous situation to continue. 

It is often said by those wanting a single food safety agency that there are anywhere from 12-17 agencies involved in food safety. But in reality, 99.9 percent of what we eat is regulated by either FSIS or FDA.

Unless you count alcohol as one of your six basic food types, I do not know why the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco and Firearms keeps showing up on these lists. Or the EPA, which does have the ability to shut down Gulf Coast commercial fishing when there is an oil spill, but most of our fish comes from overseas anyway. 

The story in Food Safety News mentioned that Obama's plan includes moving the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration, or NOAA, from the Commerce Department to Interior and bringing "all salmon regulation into one agency."

I think NOAA just has marine authority for fishing regulations, certainly not commercial salmon farming, or fresh water salmon fishing. And it gets even more convoluted when Congress, in the 2008 Farm Bill, mandated that catfish inspection move from FDA to FSIS, but left all other fish and seafood at FDA.

The Food Safety New story also said that "Obama administration officials are said to favor the merger because it would make food safety independent of USDA, which primarily exists to market and promote American farm products."

There are seven Mission Areas within the USDA. The five Undersecretaries for Food Safety; Food Nutrition and Consumer Services; Rural Development; Natural Resources and Environment;  and Research, Education and Economic will tell you they do not "primarily exist to market and promote American farm products."

One might argue, based on prior observations, that the Food and Drug Administration primarily exists to regulate medicines and medical devices.

Single Food Safety Agency. Sounds good, but guess what? We had a single food safety agency from 1906, when the Federal Meat Inspection Act and the Pure Food and Drug Acts were passed. USDA had all the authority for food safety. 

The FDA was transferred out of the USDA in 1940. A single food safety agency must not have been perceived to be working out too well back then.

 

Some would say mega-bureaucracies lose the nimbleness necessary to respond to outbreaks and other emergencies. Agencies like the Department of Homeland Security come to mind.

Maybe the scariest thing about this whole idea of a single food safety agency, located at FDA is that Carol Tucker-Foreman and I agree that it is a bad idea. We don't agree on too much, so when we do, it must be a really good idea (non-O157 STECs as adulterants in beef, for example) or a really bad idea (single food safety agency at FDA).

,

And 3,000 will die, according to a radio spot.

Many in the food-safety community know these facts, but lots of people do not.

Who is spreading this news?

None other than the Food Safe Families campaign, a project of the Ad Council and USDA's Food Safety and Inspection Service, the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, and the U.S. Food and Drug Administration.

The campaign, which began last year, received complete coverage June 29 in a Food Safety News story by Gretchen Goetz.

Federal food safety agencies have long used public service announcements, but most have been childish and, for sure, not anything that would give the food industry any stomach aches. In the past, those PSAs avoided the simple truth that food poisoning is about illness and death. 

An example of those can be found on FSIS's area of YouTube. Called "The Cooking Challenge," it had a team of girls lose to a team of boys in properly preparing some kind of frozen food.  "We failed," say the girls, who did not read the food industry's instructions on the package. Thankfully, there were no spankings.

The Food Safe Family spots are much smarter and more direct. They don't just say that something "icky" might happen.  They say people are going to get sick and die, so listen up about avoiding cross contamination or keeping kitchen surfaces clean.

Why is this new campaign so much better?

Some might think the Food Safe Families campaign is more honest because the private nonprofit Ad Council gets private sector talent involved and - presto - a better product emerges.   

That may be true, but this is probably not the first time the Ad Council has been brought in to do a food safety campaign. My bet is that somewhere in here is someone with some political backbone. This an effort that deserves to be rewarded, and I am going to tell you how to do it.

It as simple as this. If you like these PSAs, why not help us get more of them aired?

Public service announcements run in time slots donated by commercial TV and radio stations. Generally speaking, station managers or the minions they've assigned to PSAs give preference to local organizations. But after that - and this is the secret - most stations run national PSAs that are either trendy or that they've been asked to run by their listening audience.

If all of you who care about getting this kind of a food safety message out would just send your commercial stations an email telling them where they can find these spots and encouraging them to give them some time slots, the PSAs will get airtime. (The station can go to "Get Ads" for the spots in the chosen format. They are free to the radio and tv stations.) Just be nice when you ask!

Helping get them some airtime is a great way to thank those who showed some spine by equating foodborne illness with sickness and death. Outside your community's Children's Hospital, you'd be surprised at how many people do not know that 128,000 people will be hospitalized and 3,000 people will die in 2012 from what they eat.